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Modernism, Nationalism, and the Rhetoric
of Reconstruction
Nathaniel Berman*
We do not lack systems, but energy-the energy to conform our
morals to our ways of feeling.
Maurice Barr~s, The Enemy of the Laws (1893)'
Hollow! It's all hollow! A chasm! It's cracking! Can you hear?
There's something--down there-that's following us! Away!
Away!
Alban Berg, Wozzek (1923)2
Under such circumstances, the principle of self-determination of
peoples may be called into play. New aspirations of certain sections
of a nation, which are sometimes based on old traditions or on a
common language and civilisation, may come to the surface and
produce effects which must be taken into account in the interests of
the internal and external peace of nations.
Commission of Jurists, Aaland Islands Case (1920)1
[The Minority Protection] Treaties make ... an exceedingly bold
claim; for they maintain that it is possible to put an end to the whole
movement towards so-called national self-determination... in favor
of a true 'self-determination' based on feelings of political loyalty.
* © Nathaniel Berman, 1992. I would like to thank Lama Abu-Odeh, Lisa Ernst, Christopher
Gasset, David Kennedy, Duncan Kennedy, Anne Lubell, and Elaine Walsh for their comments on
earlier drafts of this paper.
1. MAURICE BARRts, L'ENNEMI DES Lois 4 (1910; 1st ed. 1893). Maurice Barr~s (1862-1923)
was a French political writer and activist, whose non-conformist synthesis of nationalism and
socialism served as an important precursor to the new ideological composites of the first half of the
twentieth century. See ZEEV STERNHELL, MAURICE BARRtS ET LE NATIONALISME FRANqAIS
(1972).
(All translations are mine unless otherwise noted.)
2. ALBAN BERG, WOZZEK: OPERA IN THREE ACTS AFTER THE DRAMA "WOYZEK" BY GEORG
BOCHNER Act I, Scene 2 (London Records, 1981; libretto: Sarah E. Soulsby trans., modified by
author; 1st ed. 1923). Alban Berg was a composer of the "Second Viennese School" led by Arnold
Schoenberg.
3. Report of the International Commission of Jurists Entrusted by the Council of the League of
Nations with the Task of Giving an Advisory Opinion on the Aaland Islands Question, League of
Nations O.J., Spec. Supp. 3, at 6 (1920). This was the first adjudicatory decision relating to self-
determination after the conclusion of the post-World War I peace settlement.
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C.A. Macartney, National States and National Minorities (1934) 4
We live at a time of renewed historical consciousness-in part due to
the events in the former "East," in part due to two decades of millennial
pronouncements by many in the humanities and social sciences. Many
declare that something called "Western modernity" has reached its cul-
mination, and is either irrevocably disintegrating or is in urgent need of
reconstruction. This way of talking, however, tends to conflate several
centuries of intellectual history, failing to specify which "modernity" is at
issue. In this essay,t I will suggest that we can gain useful insight on
current legal and cultural debates by situating ourselves in relation to
that period of early twentieth-century intellectual history known as
"Modernism," that phase of the history of "modernity" which has most
shaped our own intellectual condition.
Specifically, I will discuss the relationship between certain broad char-
acteristics of Modernist cultural renewal and the changes wrought in
international law by various legal writers between the World Wars. This
juxtaposition of forms of law with other forms of culture should not be
viewed as a claim of a direct correlation or "influence," but, rather, as
indicating an overlapping series of responses to a common cultural situa-
tion. The juxtaposition suggests that transformations in legal thought
can be productively viewed as participating in, and, indeed, partly creat-
ing, deep shifts in Western cultural history. The most important of such
shifts in the first decades of our century, I would argue, was the advent of
the central Modernist problematic: the paradoxical relationship between
"primitivism" and experimentalism, a problematic that gave rise to a
range of responses both among and within various cultural domains.
My interest in cultural Modernism should be viewed as part of a chal-
lenge to the dominant approaches to legal history, particularly interna-
tional legal history. In international law, historical work tends to be
undertaken with either a jurisprudential or a pragmatic interest. From
the first perspective, one examines historical writings for their contribu-
tions to a perennial theoretical and logical project; one evaluates earlier
theorists' excessive (or insufficient) reliance on naturalism, positivism,
"pure theory," and sociological jurisprudence. From the second perspec-
tive, one views legal history as a series of specific responses to local
problems; in the search for better solutions, one tallies up successes and
failures and searches for causes and effects. Those who engage in legal
t This paper was originally delivered as a talk at a seminar at the Universit6 Catholique de
Louvain, Belgium, in December, 1990. The portion of this paper concerned with Modernism and
legal history in the interwar period is a condensation of a much longer work in progress: "The
Enemy of the Laws"? The Question of the European Nationalities and the Modernist Renewal of
International Law, 1920-39 (MS, 1992).
4. C.A. MACARTNEY, NATIONAL STATES AND NATIONAL MINORITIES 278 (1934).
Macartney's study, published under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, is
one of the most frequently cited period sources on the question of nationalities between the wars.
[Vol. 4: 351
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history for the purpose of furthering linear progress in either jurispru-
dence or pragmatic policy tend to gloss over legal history's fundamental
breaks and controversies; they also tend to view legal history in isolation
from other cultural developments, an isolation which often precludes
insight into the deeper meaning of legal change.
My historical study has concentrated on a disparate group of interna-
tional legal writers-theorists, practitioners, judges-who worked in the
aftermath of World War I to recast international law through focusing
on the problem of European nationalism. In the period preceding the
War, four Empires, Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Ottoman
Turkey, had been understood to provide the primary conditions of the
region's political structure. Many had thought that the mid-nineteenth-
century problem of nationalities had been settled by the European order
of the "Age of Empire";' indeed, as late as 1918, even the Allied Powers
viewed the postwar survival of the Austro-Hungarian Empire as a Euro-
pean "necessity." 6 This attitude is quite understandable: an extraordi-
nary act of imagination is required to conceive of any domain of human
life absent those structuring elements hitherto perceived as indispensable
for coherent thought and action. Only a combination of military, polit-
ical, and ideological events compelled the Allies to face the challenge
posed by imperial disintegration.7 One of the central tasks of the postwar
world would henceforth be to figure out the appropriate relationship
between national identity and state sovereignty in the complex ethnic and
political conditions of Central Europe.
The legal writers on whom I focus sought to create a new and complex
way of thinking about postwar Europe that would take into account the
subtle issues raised by the passions of peoples. They saw the "old," pre-
war international law, with its narrow rigor and need for certainties, as a
product of an ossified nineteenth-century culture, a culture surpassed by
the new era's intellectual and political developments. Confronted with
the nationalist challenge, the "old" law could only attempt in vain either
to ignore or to repress what its outmoded concepts could not
comprehend.
This legal watershed thus bore a strong affinity with transformations in
other areas of high European culture between the 1890's and the 1930's.
Like the new international lawyers, cultural Modernists-whether art-
ists, literary writers, psychoanalysts, or nonconformist political theorists
5. The Habsburg Empire, about to disintegrate under various national pressures, illustrates the
limitations of nationalism. For though most of its people were, by the early 1900's,
unquestionably conscious of belonging to some nationality or other, few of them thought that
this was incompatible with support for the Habsburg monarchy.
ERIC HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF EMPIRE: 1875-1914 163 (1989). See also ALFRED COBBAN, THE
NATION STATE AND NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION 46-49 (1969).
6. COBBAN, supra note 5, at 53-54.
7. Id. at 54-56.
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of left and right-sought to reinvigorate their respective domains by
transcending what they saw as the surface platitudes of nineteenth-cen-
tury bourgeois culture. For the purpose of transforming the current
practice of international legal history (and at the consequent risk of over-
simplification), I have isolated several basic characteristics of a certain
tendency in this movement which I would call "high Modernism." 8 I
would describe high Modernism as marked by the following four basic
features: 1) the critique of representation; 2) an openness to so-called
"primitive" sources of cultural energy; 3) innovative experimentation
with the technical means specific to each cultural medium; and 4) the
juxtaposition, in a single work, of elements considered irreconcilable
under traditional criteria of coherence.
The basic presupposition for high Modernist cultural renewal was the
critique of representation-in other words, the abandonment of conform-
ity to given natural or conventional subject matter as the primary goal of
cultural creation.9 Modernists called for "emancipation from depen-
dence on nature,"' seeking to displace the privileged role of the criteria
by which many had measured Western cultural works since the Renais-
sance. Modernists demonstrated that these supposedly "natural" criteria
were simply those of one possible signifying system, one possible vocabu-
lary of expression. The Modernist cultural upheaval aimed at an
unleashing of the signifying imagination, the licensing of a range of
efforts to create new expressive vocabularies whose validity would no
longer be measured by the privilege formerly accorded to imitation. This
de-privileging of the object of representation radically brought into ques-
tion the foundations of culture and politics as they had been understood
by some previous versions of "modernity."
Once freed from the constraints of representation, Modernists engaged
in two general types of exploration. First, they sought to renew Euro-
pean culture through recourse to what they viewed as "primitive"
sources of cultural energy, such as the art of children, peasants, and non-
European peoples. The Modernists' "primitives" included the whole cat-
alogue of those whom the high-cultural European male had repressed
and fantasized about for millennia. The Modernists now sought them
8. Following the work of such writers as Peter Biirger and Andreas Huyssen, I would
distinguish high Modernism from the "avant-garde." See PETER BORGER, THEORY OF THE AVANT
GARDE (Michael Shaw trans., 1984); ANDREAS HUYSSEN, AFTER THE GREAT DIVIDE:
MODERNISM, MASS CULTURE, POSTMODERNISM (1986).
9. A critique of the centrality of "imitation," "subject matter," the "anecdotal,"
"representation," etc., abounds in the writings of artists and aestheticians in the first three decades of
our century. The painter Lger declared flatly: "I transcribe this question in all its simplicity: 'What
does this represent?' . . . [I] will try hard, in a very brief essay, to demonstrate this question's total
inanity." Fernand Lger, Les Origines de la Peinture et sa valeur reprdsentative (1913), in
FONCTIONS DE LA PEINTURE 11 (1965).
10. WASILY KANDINSKY, CONCERNING THE SPIRITUAL IN ART 71 (Francis Golffing et al.
trans., 1947; 1st ed. 1912).
[Vol. 4: 351
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out--or, rather, sought out their own fantasies about them."1 Secondly,
however, the critique of representation led Modernists in a seemingly
opposite direction: the radical development of the sophisticated tech-
niques of European high culture. Released from the constraints of repre-
sentation, cultural creators would be able to experiment with their
media, creating works marked by an unprecedented diversity. 12 Modern-
ist "experimentalism" thus meant specialization, the multiplication of
expressive means accomplished through the internal development of the
intrinsic resources of each particular medium; "specialization," wrote
one Modernist, is the "modem thing."1 3
Intellectual historians have characterized these two dimensions of
Modernism in various ways, depending on the aspects of early twentieth-
century culture studied: the "archaic" and the "futuristic,"' 4 the
"expressive" and the "constructive,"' 5 the "primitivist" and the
"abstract," 6 and so forth.17 Although these two dimensions-whatever
particular form they took and however characterized-seem quite
opposed as cultural directions, they were very closely related in Modern-
ist theory and practice. As one commentator notes, "[t]he alliance of
primitivism and abstraction is one of the most copiously documented
facts of the [Modernist] period."'"
11. See ROBERT GOLDWATER, PRIMITIVISM IN MODERN ART 250-71 (enlarged ed., 1986; 1st
ed. 1938), for an analysis of the differences between the Modernists' use of "primitive" art and such
art taken "in itself."
12. For Kandinsky, for example, painters should not be limited by the demands of fidelity to
social conventions or natural objects. Rather, they should freely explore the "purely pictorial"
possibilities-line, color, and form painted on a flat canvas-intrinsic to their medium. For
example,
Legitimate and illegitimate combinations of colors, the shock of contrasting colors, the silencing
of one color by another, the sounding of one color through another, the checking of fluid color
spots by contours of design, the overflowing of these contours, the mingling and the sharp
separation of surfaces, all these open great vistas of purely pictorial possibility.
KANDINSKY, supra note 10, at 66 (emphasis added). Similarly, discussing new forms of dance,
Kandinsky explains that they are able to explore dance's specificity, viz, "the interior meaning of
motion," by ridding themselves of historically encrusted layers of meaning. Id. at 71.
13. Lger, supra note 9, at 19.
14. CARL SCHORSKE, FIN-DE-SIICLE VIENNA: POLITICS AND CULTURE 167 (1980). See also
Stephen Eric Bonner and D. Emily Hicks, Expressionist Painting and the Aesthetic Dimension, in
PASSION AND REBELLION: THE EXPRESSIONIST HERITAGE 237, 242 (Stephen Eric Bonner &
Douglas Kellner eds., 1983). ("To juxtapose the premodern to the modem . . . itself became a
hallmark of 'modernism.' ")
15. THEODOR ADORNO, AESTHETIC THEORY 363 (C. Lenhardt trans., 1984).
16. See, e.g., J.C. Middleton, The Rise of Primitivism and its Relevance to the Poetry of
Expressionism and Dada, in THE DISCONTINUOUS TRADITION: STUDIES IN GERMAN LITERATURE
IN HONOUR OF ERNEST LUDWIG STAHL 182 (P.F. Ganz ed., 1971). Middleton views the concept of
"primitivism" as usefully encompassing a wide range of revolts against nineteenth-century culture
that sought cultural renewal in unconventional or repressed sources. Among these "primitive"
sources were "prelogical or savage art," "naive European art," "alogism in poetry," "infantilism,"
"resuscitation of folk forms," "exoticism," and "atavism." Id. at 184-85.
17. See FREDRIC JAMESON, FABLES OF AGGRESSION 14 (1979). ("The various modernisms all
seek to overcome.., reification.., by the explorations of a new Utopian and libidinal experience of
the various sealed realms or psychic compartments to which they are condemned, but which they
also reinvent.")
18. Middleton, supra note 16, at 194.
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The "alliance" between these two new dimensions, these two
"extremes, '"' 9 was explicitly stressed by various Modernists. Bart6k, for
example, wrote that
it is a noteworthy fact that artistic perfection can only be achieved
by one of two extremes: on the one hand by peasant folk in the mass,
completely devoid of the culture of the town-dweller, on the other
by creative power of an individual genius. The creative impulse of
anyone who has the misfortune to be born between these two
extremes leads only to barren, pointless and misshapen works.2 °
Bart6k viewed the contemporary versions of these "extremes," peasant
music and advanced atonal experimentalism, as "apparently opposite
tendenc[ies]." 2 Nonetheless, he envisioned their productive juxtaposi-
tion in the same work. In works contrasting the "extremes," "the opposi-
tion of the two tendencies reveals more clearly the individual properties of
each, while the effect of the whole becomes all the more powerful." '22
The "alliance" Modernists sought between the two new dimensions of
cultural experimentation would thus not be some synthesis or balance,
19. Federico Garcia Lorca, Teatro para el pueblo (1934), quoted in A. Sinclair, Elitism and the
Cult of the Popular in Spain, in VISIONS AND BLUEPRINTS: AVANT-GARDE CULTURE AND
RADICAL POLITICS IN EARLY TWENTIETH-CENTURY EUROPE 221, 230 (Edward Timms & Peter
Collier eds., 1988):
There is one audience we have found not to be fond of us: the middle one, the bourgeoisie,
frivolous and given to materialism. Our audience, those who really grasp what the art of the
theater is all about, is found at the two extremes: the cultured classes, university educated, or
formed by their own artistic or intellectual cultural life, or the people, of the poorest and
roughest, uncontaminated, virgin, a fertile ground for all the tremors of grief and the turns and
reversals of grace.
Similarly, the Russian Futurists Velimir Khlebnikov and Aleksei Kruchenykh saw both kinds of
departure from traditional verse as important parts of their program of literary renewal. The new
verse would take one of two forms:
1. As if it were written and read in the twinkling of an eye! (singing, splash, dance, throwing
down of clumsy structures, forgetting, unlearning).
2. As if it were written with difficulty, more uncomfortable than blacked boots or a truck in a
drawing room.
Quoted in MARJORIE PERLOFF, THE FUTURIST MOMENT: AVANT-GARDE, AVANT GUERRE, AND
THE LANGUAGE OF RUPTURE 124 (1986). Perloff comments:
To make the reader see something as if for the first time, to defamiliarize . . . the object, "to
transfer the visual perception of an object into the sphere of a new perception," the poet either
"speeds up" or "slows down" the familiar poetic process, either produces a text that appears to
be spontaneous and improvisatory ("singing, splash, dance"), thus allowing us to forget, to
unlearn what we had taken a "poem" to be, or, by foregrounding artifice, difficult locution, and
highly contrived sound patterning, the poet makes us feel "more uncomfortable than blacked
boots or a truck in a drawing room."
The poetry of the past ... must, in any case, be scrapped.
Id.
20. Bela Bart6k, The Relation of Folk Song to the Development of the Art Music of Our Time
(1921), reprinted in ESSAYS 320, 322 (Benjamin Suchoff ed., 1976).
21. Id. at 323.
22. Id. at 324 (emphasis added). On the general phenomenon in early twentieth-century music
of the juxtaposition of disparate musical elements in a single work, see Chapter Four
("Simultaneity") in H.H. STUCKENSCHMIDT, TWENTIETH-CENTURY Music (1969).
Stuckenschmidt relates this technique to similar developments in poetry and painting. Id. at 71.
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but, rather, a disjunctive juxtaposition. The "alliance" would facilitate
each of the "extremes" precisely through their polar disparity.
The Modernist understanding of these two new dimensions marked a
rupture with "modernity's" previous understanding of the relationship
between high culture and its foundational elements. For many Modern-
ists, the subversive "primitive" they now viewed as the founding dimen-
sion of culture had little in common with the notion of stable "first
principles." They rejected what they saw as naive, romantic efforts to
open high Western culture to influences from its various "others" with-
out challenging Western culture's underlying conception. The Modern-
ists viewed this effort as based on a sentimental view of those "others," a
view which imagined one could depict them using traditional methods of
representation. For Modernists, the "primitive" was precisely that
which resisted traditional representation due to its primal, multiple, or
explosive nature.23
Paradoxically, Modernists thought that it would be precisely through
experimental exploration of the intrinsic resources of cultural media that
the "primitive" could be evoked in its authenticity. Conversely, it was
only the introduction of the "primitive" into Western culture that would
free that culture to engage in sophisticated formal explorations. The
experimental and the "primitive" would thus stand in a relationship of
reciprocal evocation and facilitation, a reciprocity resting precisely on
the radical discontinuity and mutual exclusion of the two dimensions.
The "primitive" would not serve as a stable ground for the experimental,
nor would the experimental merely provide the rational articulation of
that which the "primitive" left mute. For the painter Kandinsky, for
example, "[t]he freer the abstract form, the purer and more 'primitive'
the [spiritual] vibration." 24
The fourth characteristic of Modernism-the juxtaposition of elements
irreconcilable under traditional criteria of coherence-should be seen in
relation to the first three. Longing for contact with an explosive, "primi-
tive" reality, Modernists boldly sought unprecedented means of evoking
that which could not be traditionally represented. Moreover, freed from
traditional representational constraints, Modernists could develop new
syntactical combinations whose logic did not conform to the logic of per-
ception. 25 Modernists, therefore, created complex compositions of heter-
ogeneous elements, compositions whose unifying principles would only
come into being with the work itself. Finally, sensitive to the intrinsic
potential of each medium, an artist working with several media would
not seek a direct translation of the "content" of each into the other, but
23. See generally GOLDWATER, supra note 11.
24. KANDINSKY, supra note 10, at 50.
25. See, e.g., Lger, supra note 9; Maurice.Raynal, Conception and Vision (1912), reprinted in
EDWARD F. FRY, CUBISM 94 (1966).
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would create composite works whose elements would harmonize with
each other only indirectly.
The paradoxical relationship of radical discontinuity and reciprocal
facilitation between the two dimensions of Modernism took various
forms. In this essay, I will illustrate these forms with several aesthetic
and legal examples. I will begin with two familiar examples of Modernist
aesthetics, drawn from the works of the painters Pablo Picasso and
Wasily Kandinsky. I will then proceed to show how much of interwar
international legal writing can be seen as a form of Modernism; I will
specify this proposition with the two principal international legal
responses to the problem of European nationalism: plebiscitary self-
determination and international minority protection. Finally, I will turn
to some of the more audacious and troubling dimensions of Modernism,
through the examples of the architect Le Corbusier's "Plans" and the
comprehensive legal programs for internationalizing certain European
regions with particularly vexing nationalist conflicts. Throughout, I will
show how various versions of Modernism in the arts can be productively
understood as forming an overlapping series with various versions of
legal Modernism.
My first aesthetic example is Picasso's painting Les Demoiselles
d'Avignon (1907), one of the inaugural works of twentieth-century art.
The painting depicts five female figures, all subjected in various ways to
perceptual distortions breaking with the "classical norm for the human
figure." 26 One art historian has described the painting in words that cap-
ture significant aspects of the Modernist sensibility: the "most immediate
quality of Les Demoiselles is a barbaric dissonant power," reflecting
Picasso's "fascination with the primitive"; the painting shows the depths
and range of this fascination "not only in explicit references to Iberian
sculpture in the three nudes at the left and to African Negro [sic] sculp-
ture in the two figures at the right but in the savagery that dominates the
painting."'2 7 This description reflects the way in which such Modernist
creations embodied certain characteristic Western fantasies about the
"primitive."
Strangely enough, the historical importance of this openness to the
"primitive" lay in the way it facilitated Picasso's formal, "purely picto-
rial" explorations that led to the development of Cubism. Having aban-
doned the traditional conventions for representing the human figure, Les
Demoiselles d'Avignon liberated the artist to engage in "painterly" inno-
vations-particularly the abandonment of linear perspective and the use
26. FRY, supra note 25, at 13.
27. ROBERT ROSENBLUM, CUBISM AND TWENTIETH-CENTURY ART 12 (1966). It is, of course,
highly significant that this inaugural moment of Modernist art occurs through the deformation of
the female body. See, e.g., JULIA KRISTEVA, LA RtVOLUTION DU LANGUAGE POtTIQUE (1974);
ALICE JARDINE, GYNESIS: CONFIGURATIONS OF WOMAN AND MODERNITY (1985).
[Vol. 4: 351
8
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol4/iss2/7
Berman
Pablo Picasso, Les Demoiselles d'Avignon. Paris 1907. Oil on canvas, 8' x 7'8". Collection, the
Museum of Modem Art. New York. Acquired through the Lillie P. Bliss Bequest.
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of a single source of light-impossible under a representational r6gime.
It initiated that typically Cubist fragmentation of the depicted object into
geometrical facets, a fragmentation in which volume is depicted through
contrasting planes, rather than through an illusionistic representation of
objects. The juxtaposed facets of the object were thus perceptually
inconsistent, for such "faceting produced a complex structure of planes
at different levels and going in different directions."2 The Cubists pro-
duced richer "purely pictorial" works precisely by abandoning the goal
of representational accuracy and coherence.29
Les Demoiselles and its aftermath inaugurated the Modernist pursuit
of painterly goals solely through the intrinsic resources of the flat surface
of the canvas, rather than through an appeal to the world of perception.
The painting thus marked a peculiarly Modernist conjuncture: between
the European fantasy of the "primitive" as "savage," even "monstrous,"
and the creation of a new, eminently sophisticated form of high Euro-
pean art. a° Specifically, the painting illustrates the way in which the dis-
integration of the traditional "object" of painting, a disintegration
occurring under "primitivist" pressure, posed purely artistic challenges
that led to the formal exploration of the high-cultural potential of the
medium.
My second aesthetic example is the highly influential essay by Kandin-
sky, Concerning the Spiritual in Art, published in 1912. Kandinsky
called for the liberation of art's autonomous resources, declaring that
"conventional beauty must go, and the literal element, 'storytelling,' or
'anecdote' must be abandoned."3 At the same time, he argued that it
was precisely through this critique of representation that art would be
able to touch the deepest recesses of the human soul. He rejected any
traditional attempt to represent those recesses, an attempt he believed to
be characteristic of the tepid mixture of "mood" and "nature" that pro-
duced impressionism. 2 Rather, he declared, "form alone, even though
abstract and geometrical, has its internal resonance." 33 Indeed, the art-
work can evoke this "internal resonance" only through progressively
abandoning representational reference as its guiding principle. To
28. DOUGLAS COOPER, THE CUBIST EPOCH 45 (1971). For example, describing Georges
Braque's Harbor in Normandy (1909), Cooper notes that the painter "has seen to it that where a
facet leads the eye backwards into the pictorial space this is countered by one which brings it
forward again." Id. at 40.
29. See Raynal, supra note 25, at 94.
30.There was also this large painting . ..which has since been called "Les Demoiselles
d'Avignon" and which constitutes the point of departure for Cubism.... The painting ...
appeared to everyone as something insane or monstrous.... [The right half] is really the point
of departure of a new art.
DAVID HENRY KAHNWEILER, MES GALlRIES ET MES PEINTRES: ENTRETIENS AVEC FRANCIS
CRtMIEUX 55-56 (1961).
31. KANDINSKY, supra note 10, at 71.
32. Id. at 24-25.
33. Id. at 47.
360 [Vol. 4: 351
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requote Kandinsky's striking phrase: "[t]he freer the abstract form, the
purer and more 'primitive' the [spiritual] vibration.13 4
Despite this critique of representation and the "purifying" separation
of the "abstract" and the "primitive," Kandinsky asserted that "form
harmony must rest only on the purposive vibration of the human soul."
The artist, therefore, must be guided by the "principle of internal neces-
sity" 35 in her choice of abstract forms. Paradoxically, therefore, art
would both be freed from the external constraints of representation, and
be strictly determined by its relationship to an unrepresentable "internal
necessity."
Kandinsky stressed that his critique of representation did not mean
that artists should banish all representational elements from their work.36
To be sure, the function of representational elements would no longer be
that of fidelity to external objects; rather, the artist would employ repre-
sentational elements, just as she uses abstract elements, only as another
means of touching the deepest spiritual resonances.37 In this way, even
the traditional elements of painting are reinterpreted and pressed into the
service of the new system.3" The Modernist work, therefore, can include
a juxtaposition of abstract forms and representational elements, a com-
plex work capable of evoking the deepest "primitive" "resonances. '39
In these two examples, the "alliance" of the "primitivist" and experi-
mentalist dimensions of Modernism functions in two quite different,
nearly inverted, ways. Picasso's painting uses the "primitive" as a dis-
ruptive force to dismantle the traditional centrality of the unified object
of perception; yet, paradoxically, the entry of this disruptive force serves
to authorize the proto-Cubist formal innovations which Picasso and
others would then develop without direct reference to the "primitive."
Kandinsky's essay moves in the opposite direction. For Kandinsky, free-
dom from representational norms is an indispensable prerequisite for
engaging in formal exploration; yet, this autonomous exploration must
be strictly guided by the "principle of internal necessity." Moreover,
34. Id. at 50.
35. Id. at 47.
36. Id. at 50.
37. Id. at 49.
38. Id. at 50.
39. For Kandinsky, the importance of this juxtaposition of the heterogeneous was further
highlighted by his insistence on the specificity and autonomy of each artistic medium. He contended
that a particular medium should not violate its own specificity by seeking simply to translate that
which is expressed in another, any more than it should seek to represent a natural or social object.
For Kandinsky, "each art has its peculiar force, which cannot be replaced by that of any other." Id.
at 40. Nonetheless, it was this very difference between the arts that allowed the possibility of their
productive juxtaposition: "each art will bring to [a] general [internal] tone its own special
characteristics, thereby adding to it a richness and power which no one art form could achieve." Id.
at 64. Such a juxtaposition would maintain each art's specificity rather than produce a
homogenizing mixture. Kandinsky's theory thus called for a proliferation of forms both within each
medium and among media in a "monumental art," an art whose unity would emerge paradoxically
from the ways in which different media create a broad range of internal spiritual resonances.
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Kandinsky claimed that experimentation should only be viewed as suc-
cessful when it is capable of evoking a "primitive" spiritual resonance.
In Les Demoiselles d'Avignon, the "primitivist" disruption serves as the
jumping-off point for autonomous, high-cultural innovation; in Concern-
ing the Spiritual in Art, the goal of autonomous, high-cultural innovation
is a return to unrepresentable, "primitive" sources of spirituality. These
two examples of Modernist aesthetics thus show inverted responses to a
common cultural problematic: the relationship between the "primitive,"
understood as subversive, and the experimental, understood as innova-
tion freed from representation.
At this point, I would like to present an initial outline of the parallel I
will draw between cultural Modernism and interwar understandings of
the new international law. I would compare the four basic characteris-
tics of Modernism listed above-the critique of representation, the open-
ness to the "primitive," the unprecedented exploration of the specific
means of each medium, and the juxtaposition of the heterogeneous-
with four key elements of the new international law: 1) the critique of the
view of the sovereign state as the object which defines international law
and to which it must seek to conform its doctrines and institutions; 2) an
openness to the hitherto repressed or denied forces of nationalism; 3) the
unprecedented invention of a wide variety of techniques, understood as
specifically "legal"; and 4) the juxtaposition, in international legal dis-
course, doctrines, and institutions, of elements incompatible under tradi-
tional legal criteria. In the new international law, heterogeneous
elements-reflecting such competing sources of authority as the state, the
nation, the individual, and the international community-would coexist
in international legal compositions unified only by the newly heightened
legal medium, rather than by reference to extra-legal sources of legiti-
macy. Such complex and sophisticated works would be understood, par-
adoxically, as putting legal reason in touch with the deepest desires of
popular nationalist energy. Sovereignty, like the representational ele-
ments in Modernist painting, would not be banished but would be
pressed into the service of the new system. Finally, just as the relation-
ship between the "primitive" and the experimental was understood and
expressed in various ways by cultural Modernists, so the new interna-
tional law would be marked by a wide diversity of forms, each presenting
a version of international legal Modernism.
Like all Modernists, many interwar lawyers criticized the taken-for-
granted objects hitherto thought to define their domain. This legal ver-
sion of the critique of representation took the form of a rejection of so-
called "international legal positivism"-i.e., the notion that established
sovereign states were the sole source of international legal authority and
that the relationships between sovereigns constituted that law's sole sub-
ject matter. Just as Modernists in other cultural areas abandoned repre-
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sentation of stable objects as the goal of art, so international lawyers
rejected conformity to the needs of established sovereign states as the
touchstone of international law.
Many interwar lawyers saw the incorporation of the passionate forces
of nationalism, unleashed by the collapse of the central European
empires, as essential to the renewal of their domain, as supplying contact
with the vital ground of international life missing from nineteenth-cen-
tury international law. They did not, however, understand this incorpo-
ration as the replacement of an unauthentic, superficial ground of
international law-states-with a rationalist grounding of their disci-
pline in the name of such "first principles" as the "nation" or the "peo-
ple." On the contrary, many interwar lawyers' conception of nationalism
was strikingly similar to other Modernists' conception of the "primitive."
Just as other Modernists rejected naive, sentimental views of "primi-
tive" culture, so the legal Modernists rejected the liberal nationalist faith
of President Woodrow Wilson and his nineteenth-century precursors.
For liberal nationalists, the nationalist revolt against positivism, against
the centrality of traditional, multinational states, was identical with the
struggle for the creation of a rational, democratic, and peaceful world
order. This unproblematic link between nationalism and liberal democ-
racy could no longer be accepted by many interwar writers. On the con-
trary, they saw the nationalist revolt that began during World War I as
an outgrowth of irrational, explosive passion. Unmediated deference to
nationalist aspirations, therefore, could never lead to a peaceful world
order. Rather, the vital, passionate, nationalist forces, though they
served to clear the debris of ossified legal structures, had to be channeled
and given form by newly developed legal concepts, doctrines, and
institutions.
Before continuing, I would register one important caveat: just as
romantic, pre-Modernist attitudes to the "primitive" persisted in art and
other cultural domains in the early twentieth century (and, indeed, to our
own day), so liberal nationalism persisted in the attitudes of many
interwar legal writers. The international legal Modernism I discuss here
must be seen as an ideal-type. Wilsonian, liberal nationalist commenta-
ries on the Versailles system continued to influence debate even as other
legal writings elaborated the new conception I would view as specifically
Modernist. Indeed, at times one may discern liberal nationalist and
Modernist conceptions in the writings of a single author.
In essays like Le Principe des nationalitds, Professor Robert Redslob of
Strasbourg' was one of those who articulated a Modernist view of the
40. Redslob's original work was undertaken in pre-World War I, i.e. German, Alsace. Redslob
was the author of many monographs on international law, first in German, then, after the war, in
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new international law of nationalism. For Redslob, the clash between
the revolutionary aspirations of nationalism and the self-preserving will
of established states was nothing less than that between "creative free-
dom and legality." 4' Nonetheless, these "nearly irreconcilable adversa-
ries"" could enter into a relationship of reciprocal facilitation. Thus, on
the one hand, he called for the renewal of law through its deference to
the primacy of nationalist passion:
It would suffice that this primordial right [droit], taken in itself,
denuded of its dialectical and artificial exterior, come to model itself
on the real movement of nationalities, on the pathos of an elemental
force which arises in the history of peoples, in order for a true and
definitive formulation to be born. Law would no longer sanction the
most ingenious scheme of the state which has best positioned itself,
but the creative, emotional, passionate movement of people who are
carried forward by feeling towards a new constellation of their col-
lective life.43
On the other hand, however, nationalism, the primal "61an of emancipa-
tion, the tumultuous flood of history,"" can only achieve its truth by
giving way to its opposite, i.e., law. In this second moment, nationalism
would encounter [the thesis of nationalities] and make it its ally.
Having made a pact with it, it would submit to its regulative influ-
ence. Henceforth, it would no longer abandon itself to impulse, no
longer throw itself into adventures, but would look to the idea of law
for prior justification [sa justification prdalable].45
For Redslob, it is thus not a question of "balancing" legal reason and
nationalist passion, but of a particular kind of "alliance" between the
two. In a quintessentially Modernist gesture, he both views nationalism
as that "elemental force" at the source of collective life and urges it to
submit to law's "regulative influence"; conversely, he urges law both to
"model" itself on this "tumultuous flood" and to displace it as its 'Justifi-
cation prialable."
The new international law would thus take as its founding principle an
inherently explosive element. Redslob insists on the resistance national-
ism offers to traditional scientific inquiry: "One must not delude oneself
with the hope that one can cast a fully clarifying light on this crater filled
with flames and smoke."46 Like other cultural Modernists, Redslob thus
notes the intrinsic resistance to traditional representation of the "primi-
tive" source of his domain's vitality. Accordingly, the goal is not positiv-
41. ROBERT REDSLOB, LE PRINCIPE DES NATIONALITtS 93 (1930).
42. Id. at 94.
43. Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 34-35.
45. Id. at 35 (emphasis added).
46. Id. at 38.
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ist science, but a Modernist "art," '47 a new kind of legal reason.
For Redslob, nationalism provides the opportunity for a heightened
competence of the international community to engage in sensitive and
nuanced legal deliberations, as in "the great postwar settlements."48
After reviewing the considerations that guided this "comprehensive
reconstruction"49 of Central Europe, Redslob voices confidence in inter-
national law:
One must not ... capitulate before the problem and limit oneself to
concluding that the solution will be dictated in each case by the par-
ticular competing interests. Despite the variety of situations and the
fluidity of titles, it is possible to formulate some directives which
would be like the rules of a Charter delimiting the contest of primor-
dial claims.50
This new "Charter" of the international law of nationalism would not be
limited by ultimate principles like sovereignty or nationality, let alone the
traditional rules of positive law; nor would it simply play the humble role
of interest balancing. Rather, it would establish a new domain for an
autonomous international law, the domain of the "m6tajuridique. ' 1
This new domain, opened up for international law by the "primordial"
nationalist forces, would consist of the free and flexible exploration of the
legal medium, without the encumbrances of traditional conceptions.
Paradoxically, the "m6tajuridique," a Modernist international law,
would be grounded on a principle no more stable than "a crater filled
with flames and smoke."
As imagined by my selected international legal writers, "nationalism"
thus played a role strikingly similar to the role of the "primitive" in the
Modernist imagination generally. The lawyers' construction of this
"primitive" source of energy was marked by an ambivalence congruent
with that marking other high Modernists' construction of other forms of
the "primitive." 52 It was the interwar lawyers' break with both positiv-
ism and liberal nationalism that marked their radical break with their
predecessors; this double break justifies our viewing their work as a form
of Modernism, in the historically specific sense of the early twentieth-
century movement for cultural and political renewal.
The Modernist impossibility of relying either on the historically inher-
47. Id. at 38. Although this formulation has a classical ring, Redslob's reasons for the lack of
certitude in matters of justice are characteristically modernist, not Aristotelian. For Redslob the
Modernist, justice is approximative because its object is a "flaming crater," not merely because it
deals with matters that are contingent.
48. Id. at 131.
49. Id. at 129.
50. Id. at 119.
51. Id. at 122.
52. As should be apparent throughout this essay, I make no claims about whether "nationalism"
or "primitivism" really were "primitive." The fit between the Modernist construction of them and
certain recurrent themes in high Western culture makes one skeptical, to say the least.
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ited cultural forms ("states"), or on any stable "foundation" of those
forms (the "people" or "nation"), led to a radically heightened role for
the legal Modernist. The Modernist lawyers interpreted the Versailles
framework as the inauguration of an era of bold legal experimentation,
an era of unprecedented legal autonomy. They saw the relationship
between the two dimensions of legal renewal-an openness to "primi-
tive" nationalism and an embrace of experimental creativity-in a vari-
ety of ways characterized by the Modernist composite of radical
discontinuity and reciprocal facilitation.
I turn, therefore, to two forms of the "new international law" which
illustrate competing versions of the legal Modernist composite of "primi-
tivism" and experimentalism. The World War I peace treaties contained
various doctrinal and institutional solutions to the problem posed to
European stability by separatist nationalism. Each of these techniques
signified a departure from an international law formerly concerned only
with legally established states. In this section, I will discuss the Modern-
ist lawyers' interpretation of the two most important solutions: first,
internationally supervised plebiscites, as a method of granting political
self-determination to national groups, and, second, international minor-
ity protection, in the form of international guarantees for the civil rights
and cultural autonomy of those national groups not accorded the right to
self-determination.
I have studied the plebiscite through the writings of Sarah Wambaugh,
the most important interwar scholar on the law and practice of plebi-
scites. The central theme in Wambaugh's writings is the alliance
between modern social scientific "technique" and the implementation of
the passions of national groups. This composite constituted a double
departure from an international law which formerly left to sovereign dis-
cretion how (and, indeed, whether) to take into account the wishes of the
people. On the one hand, Wambaugh declared that the plebiscite was
unavoidable in an age whose characteristic feature was the demand of
peoples for control over their own destiny.53 From this perspective,
international law's departure from deference to sovereigns constituted an
openness to nationalist desire. On the other hand, she argued that the
implementation of these demands could lead to a stable international
legal order only through a "scientifically" administered voting proce-
dure. From this perspective, plebiscites constituted an enrichment of
law's sophistication through innovative experimentation with its own
unique resources. Above all, "science" demanded that the plebiscite ter-
ritory be effectively "neutralized"; 54 thus, the augmentation of interna-
tional legal authority, though authorized by nationalist desire, mandated
53. Sarah Wambaugh, La Pratique des pldbiscites internationaux, 18 RCADI 153 (1927-I1).
54. "A plebiscite in a country not effectively neutralized is a crime against political science and
against the population." Id. at 252.
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the development of precisely those autonomous legal resources most
directly contrary to those of passionately partisan nationalism.5"
Wambaugh asserted that this alliance between popular agitation and
legal "technique" was grounded historically, as well as theoretically.
During the decades preceding World War I, with the principle of nation-
alities and the right to self-determination in eclipse, only militants and
intellectuals, those representatives of the extremes of passion and reason,
were concerned with plebiscites:
Once more ... the plebiscitary method found its defenders among
the peoples whose nationalist aspirations had been stifled, and
among students of political science who wanted to perfect the tools
by which one would attain stability. 6
The modern perfection of the "technique," then, would realize both
goals: the "scientific attainment of stability" and the expression of the
formerly "stifled nationalist aspirations."
Wambaugh's description of the 1935 plebiscite in the Saar territory, a
region coveted by France and Germany, provides an example of her con-
ception of this alliance. According to Wambaugh, the Saar plebiscite
marked "the highest point yet attained by the technique of the interna-
tional plebiscite."" The great significance of this perfecting of the "tech-
nique" was due to the fact that "[t]he duty of the League to administer a
free and fair plebiscite ran counter to one of the most ardent national
movements in all history"5 -viz., the German nationalist movement,
which had fallen under the sway of the Nazis by the time of the plebi-
scite. The marshalling of the resources of modern "political science"59 in
the face of this "ardent" nationalism assured the world of the "validity"
of the "title of the Reich to the Saar."'  For Wambaugh, the "tech-
nique" of the plebiscite thus ran "counter" to "ardent nationalism"-and
yet that nationalism served as the opportunity for the "technique's"
perfection. Moreover, this alliance between "technique" and "ardency"
served to enrich traditional legal forms such as "title." Title would no
longer be based on mere historical accident or brute force, but, rather,
would acquire "validity" through the perfection of the "technique." For
Wambaugh's version of Modernism, international legal doctrines, such
55. In one passage, Wambaugh's insistence on the importance of neutrals seemed to extend' to
the realm of scholarship. She concluded her 1939 preface to her study of the Saar plebiscite with the
following:
For the benefit of readers in Germany it should perhaps be noted that the Christian name of
the author [Sarah] does not denote Hebraic descent but one from a long line of Calvinists.
SARAH WAMBAUGH, THE SAAR PLEBISCITE vii (1940). One would like to assume, of course, that
this passage was written in a tone of sarcasm.
56. Wambaugh, supra note 53, at 178.
57. Wambaugh, supra note 55, at vi.
58. Id.
59. Id. at v.
60. Id. at vi.
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as "title," would thus be enriched through technical experimentation
made possible by nationalist disruption.
International minority protection was understood as the mirror image
of plebiscitary self-determination. The League of Nations' minority pro-
tection system did not involve any alteration of sovereign frontiers.
Rather, the new and expanded states of central Europe were required to
provide civil rights and a certain cultural autonomy to the minority
groups among their inhabitants. The minority protection system sought
to maintain a separate social sphere in which the cultural life of a
national minority could flourish-without either being integrated into the
general culture of the state in which the minority resided61 or being
allowed direct representation in the international forum.62 The system
did not, for example, allow the national minorities formal legal standing
in the World Court or the League Council. Rather, the League embed-
ded its guarantees of minority rights in a complex arbitral, administra-
tive, and judicial system, designed with the most up-to-date institutional
techniques. Minority rights would thus be guaranteed by the organized
international legal community pressing the sovereigns into the service of
the new international legal order. The system constituted a departure
from deference to traditional sovereign prerogatives, while abstaining
from replacing the prerogatives of states with the prerogatives of
"nations."
Modernist lawyers understood this system in terms of its double depar-
ture from a state-centered conception of international life. The World
Court declared that the purpose of the minority protection guarantees
was to preserve for the national minority the "very essence of its life as a
minority" ("l'essence m~me de sa vie en tant que minorit6"). 63 At the
same time, however, these guarantees were designed to ensure that this
"essence" would not transcend its properly cultural domain and turn
into a demand for political autonomy. The advanced institutional and
doctrinal techniques served to block any direct representation of the
minorities in the international forum, while enmeshing the sovereigns
concerned in complex institutional discussions of matters formerly
viewed as within their sovereign discretion. Paradoxically, the two aspi-
rations of this system were viewed as inextricably related: the complexity
of the innovative international machinery was required if particular
national minority cultures were to express their "essence."
The contrast between these two solutions to the problem of national-
ism may be usefully juxtaposed with the contrast in emphasis I have
61. See, e.g., the debates over the "Mello-Franco Thesis," in which the "assimilationist"
interpretation of Minorities Treaties was repudiated, in MACARTNEY, supra note 4, at 277.
62. See The Report of the Committee Instituted by the Council Resolution of March 7 1929,
LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J., Spec. Supp. 73, at 43, 60-61 (1929).
63. Minority Schools in Albania Case, 1935 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 64, at 17.
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drawn between Picasso and Kandinsky. For Wambaugh, in response to
the "ardent" pressures of nationalist desire, international law was
authorized to suspend the power of state sovereignty to obstruct experi-
mental legal innovation. Once freed from this obstacle, the plebiscitary
"technique" was able to perfect its operations, chief among which was
the "neutralization" of the plebiscite area. Thus, while subversive
nationalist desire served as an authorizing stimulus to legal innovation,
that innovation proceeded, indeed was only meaningful if it could pro-
ceed, without reference to that "primitive." Conversely, international
minority protection installed a complex institutional machinery whose
novel procedures attenuated sovereign prerogative in the name of the
facilitation of particularistic cultural authenticity. Yet, that same
machinery firmly excluded the minorities from direct representation in
the international forum. This exclusion was viewed as the best way of
ultimately facilitating their unrepresentable "essence." Like the two ver-
sions of Modernist aesthetics discussed earlier, these two Modernist legal
forms thus give inverted accounts of the paradoxical "alliance" between
"primitivism" and experimentalism. For one account, "primitive"
nationalism serves to authorize the elaboration of its opposite, autono-
mous legal innovation; for the other account, autonomous legal innova-
tion is designed to facilitate that which it excludes, the nationalist
"essence."
These examples suggest some appealing as well as troubling qualities
of the Modernist approach. Legal Modernism, in its various forms, con-
tinues to supply the model to which most of us look for renewal of our
own ossified legal and political forms. We continue to believe in the
expansion of the legal framework beyond the sovereign state to novel
products of the legal imagination, an expansion we believe will allow for-
merly repressed national identities to flourish authentically. We continue
to view excluded national movements as potential sources of violence and
irrationality, while simultaneously supporting their struggles to achieve
the paradoxical goal of "independence in Europe."" In these and other
ways, we continue to nourish the double Modernist program for legal
and political renewal.
Nevertheless, the experience of historical Modernism, in both its legal
and cultural forms, should make the difficulties of this schema all too
clear. Deprived of both traditional and rationalist ground, the Modernist
lawyer was subject to certain characteristic difficulties. The two exam-
ples of international legal Modernism that I have discussed illustrate two
of these problems: first, an uncritical faith in procedural technique on the
part of the specialized legal adviser, and, second, a set of quandaries con-
64. I thank Professor Bankowski for bringing this phrase to my attention.
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cerning the possibility and desirability of the separation of the political
and cultural spheres.
The example of the plebiscite in the Saar graphically illustrates the
way in which faith in techniques of proceduralization can disarm any
critical perspective on the political substance established through those
techniques. Faith in the "technique" of the plebiscite, as exemplified by
the liberal Wambaugh, was compatible with sanctioning, even celebrat-
ing, the result of an election which was procedurally valid... yet which
granted the Nazis an important symbolic victory in the early stages of
their attack on civilization. In the face of an imagined divide between
cultural passion and legal reason, the "purification" of that reason
through an emphasis on technical procedures can blind even well-mean-
ing observers to the political consequences.
Conversely, the quandaries involved in all liberal attempts to establish
"separate spheres" resurfaced in specifically Modernist form in the
minority protection system's effort to segregate nationalist passion safely
in a legally defined cultural sphere. These quandaries have both interpre-
tive and institutional dimensions.
First, such attempts confront the legal reasoner with inherently inde-
terminate issues of interpretation. No satisfactory measure exists to
determine the boundary between "political" autonomy, which was to be
denied to national groups, and "cultural" autonomy, in which their aspi-
rations were to be realized. The World Court faced this problem of inter-
pretation repeatedly in its attempts to determine the scope of the
Minority Protection Treaties in particular cases.65
I would argue that this problem of indeterminacy is neither a logical
difficulty nor simply an ultimate consequence of critical Enlightenment
rationality. Rather, it reflects a specific cultural situation: that of the
Modernist whose role is both heightened and yet problematized by the
critique of representation. The judge is expected to utilize her aug-
mented authority to resolve the characteristic Modernist ambivalence:
high culture's relationship to "primitive" forces viewed as both essential
and dangerous. It should come as no surprise that a Court established to
regulate such a deep cultural ambivalence would continually come up
against the problem of indeterminacy. This problem has given rise in our
own time to a series of responses both philosophical and pragmatic. His-
torical reflection on the formation of our attitudes towards nationalism,
however, suggests that we may expect an endless proliferation of such
responses unless we come to grips with this important cultural source of
the problem of indeterminacy: once the founding principle came to be
viewed as inherently resistant to direct representation, as inherently dis-
65. The debate between the majority and dissent in the Minority Schools in Albania Case, supra
note 63, is one of the best examples of this quandary.
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continuous with high culture, the sophisticated legal decisionmaker was
left without a ground of decision capable of satisfying traditional criteria
of certainty.
Secondly, the minority protection system's institutional provisions
seem politically fragile. The establishment of a separate social sphere for
nationalist culture, to the extent it could be effective, threatens the crea-
tion of a minority culture marked by that split-off, self-contained quality
that breeds resentment and destabilizing separatism. We need only think
of the interwar political agitation of the Auslandsdeutsche, ethnic
Germans living in countries neighboring Germany, to confirm this obser-
vation. The institutional separation of spheres thus threatens to under-
mine itself through the production of the very cauldron of "primal"
energy it sought to constrain. The interpretive and institutional quanda-
ries are closely related, though I would refrain from seeking a clear
causal relationship between them; rather, they are both products of a
paradoxical cultural situation.66
We are all well aware of the absolute catastrophe of the interwar
period's conclusion. This catastrophe makes it incumbent upon us to
reflect on the ideological weakness of interwar democratic ideology in
combating fascism, and, in some cases, even in resisting its appeal. To
confirm this fact, one would need to list only some of the illustrious
interwar intellectuals who succumbed to what Sternhell has ironically
called "le charme secret du fascisme."'67 I would suggest that, in many of
66. I would argue that the structure of Jirgen Habermas's response to the German Historians'
Debate of the 1980's was quintessentially Modernist. As is well known, Habermas denounced
certain German historians for attempting to create a narrative of German cultural development
which would not require viewing the Nazi period as an irreparable rupture. In opposition to this
attempt to integrate the past, Habermas proposed the following dualist schema: on the one hand,
Germans should view their relationship to their state in terms of a "constitutional patriotism,"
loyalty to a set of procedures, a form of post-national collective identity related to the integration of
Germany into Western Europe; and, on the other hand, they should engage in a national reflection
on German cultural history that Habermas modelled on the existentialist assumption of
responsibility for one's own past. Jiirgen Habermas, Historical Consciousness and Post-Traditional
Identity: The Federal Republic's Orientation to the West, in THE NEW CONSERVATISM (Shierry
Weber Nicholsen ed. & trans., 1989). In contrast with a traditional identification with a nation-state
whose legal order would be assumed to be an expression of an underlying national identity,
Habermas's call was thus composed of a characteristically Modernist dualism: "constitutional
patriotism" entails an experimental innovation with legal form in its focus on collective identification
with a postnational order, while existential national reflection involves a heightening of ambivalent
identification with a national tradition perceived as dangerously destabilizing.
One might have expected a quite different response from Habermas given his general social theory.
Habermas's theory of communication is designed precisely to avoid viewing society as divided
between reason and its other, between rationality and vitality. Rather, Habermas seeks to strengthen
social contexts conducive to a communicative rationalization of the cultural constituents of
collective identity. Instead of adapting this theory to Germany in the 1980's, Habermas opted for a
Modernist liberalism. Germans were urged to depart simultaneously on two opposed trajectories:
towards a denationalized polity, on the one hand, and a deepened national identity, on the other
hand. I assume that Habermas will soon provide further elaboration of his notion of a "postnational
identity." Nevertheless, the paradoxical dualistic program he seemed to offer in the 1980's illustrates
the continued hold on our imagination of the Modernist method of cultural renewal, as well as our
inability to think of the problem of nationalism outside its framework.
67. ZEEV STERNHELL, LA NAISSANCE DE L'IDtOLOGIE FASCISTE 313 (1989).
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these cases, this "charme secret" stemmed from a hope that fascism
would be capable of providing social implementation of the double Mod-
ernist relationship between "primitive," authentic energy, and sophisti-
cated forms of high culture.
The liberal triumphs of Modernist sensibility, like the music of Bart6k,
embody nuanced, ironic juxtapositions of the primal and the sophisti-
cated-the former demystified, the latter energized. Reactionary Mod-
ernists,68 on the other hand, lent themselves to the prospect of a demonic
nationalist mobilization conducted through the most advanced cultural
techniques. For their part, the fascists generally rejected Modernism and
Modernists, refusing, with characteristic brutality, much of the help
offered by reactionary Modernists. Nonetheless, the astonishing blind-
ness of some of the "best minds" of that generation has bequeathed a
maddening and unavoidable challenge to a variety of intellectual
disciplines.
If, as I would claim, legal Modernism continues to shape all of our
work, we lawyers, too, must continually reflect upon some of the sources
of that blindness, even if it is still rather premature to reach any but the
most tentative and partial suggestions on this score. I would argue that
the Modernist break ushers in an ambivalent cultural situation of
emancipatory possibilities and terrifying dangers. The most important
danger is a particular kind of authoritarian temptation, terrifying in its
"modern" specificity. I turn, therefore, to some of the most audacious
forms of Modernist renewal, forms which illustrate some of Modernism's
most exciting and most disturbing aspects.
The displacement of traditional cultural forms in the name of a hetero-
geneous "primitive" immediately raised for Modernists the question of
the coordination of the resulting cultural fragments. For some, the expe-
rience of "primitivist" fragmentation led to delight in the free, anarchic
play of discontinuous signs; for others, it led to an emphasis on a height-
ened coordinative role for the Modernist creator. Cubism has often been
seen as the matrix of both possibilities.69 Cubist works were marked by
an emphasis on highly structured composition precisely in Cubism's
most radical period, the period in which all certainties about perspective,
the relationship of figure to ground, etc., were most put into question.
Thus, two of the most prominent successor movements to Cubism were
those of the anarchic Dadaists, on the one hand, and of the earnest Pur-
ists, on the other. The latter tendency reached its ultimate expression in
the stress on "planning" in Modernist rhetoric, such as the apotheosis of
68. I borrow the phrase from JEFFREY HERF, REACTIONARY MODERNISM: TECHNOLOGY,
CULTURE, AND POLITICS IN WEIMAR AND THE THIRD REICH (1984).
69. See generally KENNETH E. SILVER, ESPRIT DE CORPS: THE ART OF THE PARISIAN AVANT-
GARDE AND THE FIRST WORLD WAR, 1914-1925 (1989), and CHRISTOPHER GREEN, CUBISM AND
ITS ENEMIES (1987), for two related, though quite different, views of this matter.
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the "Plan" by the architect Le Corbusier (Charles Edouard Jeanneret-
Gris), and the transformation of "socialisme" into "planisme" by that
very Modernist political theorist and activist, Henri De Man.7" A brief
elaboration of the role of the "Plan" will serve to round out my discus-
sion of Modernism and its impact on the self-understanding of high-cul-
tural experimenters in various domains.
Le Corbusier declared that construction was no longer determined
either culturally or technologically by its traditional constituents: walls,
roof, cornice.71 This critique of conformity to traditional forms, how-
ever, immediately raised the question of the formal unity of Modernist
construction.72 If this unity was no longer dictated by tradition or physi-
cal necessity, neither could a coherently unified aesthetic form arise by
itself out of the newly fragmented architectural elements. Accordingly,
Le Corbusier turned to the notion of "regulating lines" ["tracds rigu-
lateurs"],73 pure intellectual constructs culminating in an overall Plan.
The Plan is the generator.
Without a plan, you have lack of order, and wilfulness.
The Plan holds in itself the essence of sensation.
The great problems of tomorrow, dictated by collective necessi-
ties, put the question of "plan" in a new form.
Modern life demands, and is waiting for, a new kind of plan both
for the house and for the city. 4
An architectural composition would thus be a "pure creation of the
mind";75 the architect would achieve aesthetic freedom as the coordina-
tor of the heterogeneous. Le Corbusier referred to architecture as that
"strange calling which consists in making other people-masons,
carpenters and joiners-.., stick together elements... which have noth-
ing in common." 6 In particular, it would be the role of engineers to
discover the elementary forms required for construction; it would be the
role of the architect to arrange those forms in an architectural composi-
tion. In the manner in which she arranges the elementary forms, the
architect shows whether she is an "artist" or a "mere engineer."77 Le
Corbusier applied this model of the "Plan" to urban and social planning
70. De Man was a leading figure in the Belgian socialist party between the wars. In both his
theoretical writings and his political practice, De Man played a leading role in moving the party
away from orthodox Marxism. On De Man and his influence in Belgium and France, see ZEEV
STERNHELL, NI DROITE, NI GAUCHE: L'IDtOLOGIE FASCISTE EN FRANCE 156-254 (2d ed. 1987).
71. "No wall, no roof, no cornice: the disturbing culmination of technical evolution. What
aesthetic consequences, then!" LE CORBUSIER, ARCHITECTURE D'tIPOQUE MACHINISTE 39 (1975;
1st ed. 1926).
72. Id. at 37.
73. Id.
74. LE CORBUSIER, TOWARDS A NEW ARCHITECTURE 45 (Frederick Etchells trans., 1986; 1st
ed. 1927).
75. Id. at 73.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 201.
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as well as to individual buildings.78
In their Twenties journal L'Esprit Nouveau, Le Corbusier and
Ozenfant made quite explicit the connection between their solution to the
Modernist subversion of pre-established unities and the turn to politically
elitist doctrines of coordination.79 A decade later, under the influence of
Sorelian syndicalism,"° Le Corbusier published La Ville Radieuse, a
work "Dedicated to AUTHORITY." The work's opening epigraph illu-
minated the relationship between this dedication and its Modernist con-
cept of comprehensive planning:
Plans are not politics.
Plans are the rational and poetic monument set up in the midst of
contingencies.
Contingencies are the environment: places, peoples, cultures,
78. The combination of elements from heterogeneous ideas of social organization-utopian,
communist, capitalist, pragmatic-can be seen in the details of Le Corbusier's various planning
schemes. See, e.g., the subtle analysis of Le Corbusier's "Freehold Maisonette Scheme" in CHARLES
JENCKS, MODERN MOVEMENTS IN ARCHITECTURE 35 (1973).
Le Corbusier's relationship to the "primitivism/experimentalism" schema is quite complex. On
the one hand, in at least one passage, he articulated this schema in terms similar to those I have been
highlighting throughout this essay. In a chapter entitled "Mechanical Spirit and U.S.A. Negroes,"
Le Corbusier proclaimed that African-American music was the "music of the soul joined to the
rhythm of the mechanical." LE CORBUSIER, QUAND LES CATHftDRALES fTAIENT BLANCHES 180
(1937). On the other hand, however, Le Corbusier's writings, from his Purist period forward, were
aimed at replacing "primitivist" disruption with the search for rational, universal forms. For Le
Corbusier and his Purist comrade Ozenfant, the merit of the Cubists lay in their rejection of
naturalistic representation, their stress on the "predominance of the plastic over the descriptive."
AMEDEE OZENFANT & LE CORBUSIER, APRtS LE CUBISME 14 (1918). Cubist inquiry into the
purely "plastic" quality of objects, however, suffered from arbitrariness. Instead of dissolving
objects to discover their fundamental elements, Cubism dissolved them haphazardly, showing "only
their accidental aspects" and creating "arbitrary and fantastic forms." Le Corbusier and Amedee
Ozenfant, Purism (1920), in MODERN ARTISTS ON ART 58, 65 (Robert Herbert ed., 1964). Purist
art, like Cubism, would free itself from merely given objects and recognize their constructed quality.
However, Purism would avoid the Cubist error in failing to "seek out the invariable constituents of
their chosen themes, which could have formed a universal, transmittable language." Id. The purists
believed that the "highest delectation of the human mind is the perception of order, and the greatest
human satisfaction is the feeling of collaboration in this order." Id. at 73. For the Purists, therefore,
"painting is a question of architecture." Id. at 70.
This post-Cubist context helps explain Le Corbusier's glorification of planning in his theoretical
treatments of architecture itself. It also explains Le Corbusier's replacement of other Modernists'
"primitives" with the "primitives" of the modern world, viz, engineers. On Le Corbusier's
description of engineers as new "primitives," see LE CORBUSIER, TOWARDS A NEW
ARCHITECTURE, supra note 74, at 14. See also REYNER BANHAM, THEORY AND DESIGN IN THE
FIRST MACHINE AGE 122-23, 229 (2d. ed. 1967).
79. See, e.g., Le Corbusier & Amedee Ozenfant, Ce que nous avons fait, ce que nous ferons, I1
ESPRIT NOUVEAU 1211, 1214 (1921).
OUR DESIRE, THEN, IS FOR THIS REVIEW TO PROVOKE THE INDISPENSABLE
CONNECTION OF ELITES. Addressing itself to leaders [aux conducteurs], Esprit Nouveau
hopes to give them an ever greater understanding of the 'cutting-edge ideas' ['idies forces'].
Prominent among the latter in the arts were "Cubism and Purism, expressions of 'idjes forces' that
have provoked transformations in the arts equal to those scientific discoveries which have totally
transformed [current] conditions . I..." d  at 1214.
80. See Robert Fishman, From the Radiant City to Vichy: Le Corbusier's Plans and Politics,
1928-1942, in THE OPEN HAND: ESSAYS ON LE CORBUSIER (Russell Walden ed., 1977). On the
relationship between Sorelian syndicalism and fascism, see STERNHELL, supra note 67, passim.
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Indeed, the desire for a "nonpolitical" Plan to coordinate the heterogene-
ous contingencies of modem life reflected Le Corbusier's ongoing advo-
cacy of an "Authority outside the 'established disorder' to assert the
common good." 82 Unfortunately, as in the case of Henri De Man, Le
Corbusier's Modernist apotheosis of the elite Plan brought him beyond
authoritarian temptation to an active pursuit of collaboration with fas-
cism. Following Robert Fishman, I would offer the following hypothe-
sis: when Le Corbusier offered his services to the Vichy government, it
was because he saw in the new r6gime the specific kind of authority
required to implement his unprecedentedly heterogeneous Plans. 3 The
step from complex Modernist composition to advocacy of authoritarian
social planning and active collaboration was, of course, not inevitable-
nor was it simply coincidental.84
In international law this impulse toward comprehensive reconstruc-
tion culminated in the design, implementation, and interpretation of the
regimes for the three internationalized regions of the interwar period: the
Saar, a region claimed by France and Germany, and Danzig and Upper
Silesia, regions claimed by Poland and Germany. Such comprehensive
legal constructions combined heterogeneous elements such as traditional
forms of state sovereignty and novel (and divergent) techniques such as
plebiscitary self-determination and international minority protection.
These regimes embodied all four of the characteristics of legal Modern-
ism: an attenuation of the centrality of states as the traditional structur-
ing elements of international order, an openness to nationalist desire, an
embrace of legal innovation, a juxtaposition of disparate legal elements.
81. LE CORBUSIER, THE RADIANT CITY, title page (Pamela Knight et al. trans., 1967; 1st ed.
1933).
82. Fishman, supra note 80, at 251.
83. Id.
84. The writings of Henri De Man during the German occupation are one striking illustration of
the relationship between the double Modernist critique of prevailing political forms and the
authoritarian temptation. In July 1940, De Man argued that the war had brought the collapse of an
ossified system of capitalist nation-states:
The war has brought the debacle of the parliamentary regime and of capitalist plutocracy in the
so-called democracies. For the working classes and for socialism, this collapse of a decrepit
world, far from being a disaster, is a deliverance.... Peace was not able to emerge from the free
accord of sovereign states and rival imperialism; it will be able to emerge from a Europe unified
by the force of arms where economic frontiers will have been levelled.
Henri De Man, Manifeste aux membres du parti ouvrier beige, in LE "DOSSIER LEOPOLD Ill": ET
AUTRES DOCUMENTS SUR LA PtRIODE DE LA SECONDE GUERRE MONDIALE 183 (Michel Br6laz ed.,
1989).
Approximately one year later, he argued that Belgium, whose unity as a "state" was rendered
problematic by the intrinsically multiple nature of the underlying "nation," both depended for its
survival on this new, "unified Europe," and would facilitate its transcendence of old forms:
The very existence of Belgium depends entirely on the realization of certain conditions on a
European scale .... [I] see a magnificent task reserved to Belgium in a Europe economically
unified and ordered for the sake of durable peace, precisely because Belgium constitutes an
exception to the rule of identity between State, people, and language.
Henri De Man a parli (May 1941?), in LE DOSSIER, supra, at 212, 216.
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Such heterogeneously composed regimes found their legal coherence in
the heightened authority of the legal imagination-for only the aug-
mented role and creativity of the Modernist lawyer could provide a uni-
fying ground for the creation of novel legal forms out of elements
irreconcilable under traditional criteria of coherence.
The League regime for Upper Silesia was the most complex of these
regimes, constructed through the deployment of all of the new interna-
tional legal techniques. Upper Silesia's "true" national character was
disputed between Poland and Germany due to the intrinsically polyva-
lent nature of national identities and loyalties in the region.8 5 The region
was partitioned between the two states after an "expert" interpretation of
the results of an internationally supervised plebiscite.8 6 It was then
placed under a fifteen-year international regime designed to ensure the
temporary unity of the region. The regime included extensive provisions
for minority protection. These and other provisions were institutionally
guaranteed by international adjudicatory and administrative bodies.
Upper Silesia, though partitioned between two sovereigns, thus had a
legal system partially unified through international doctrines and
institutions.
Georges Kaeckenbeeck, who played a key role in the workings of that
"composite experiment,"8 " described the regime's creation as follows:
[The Geneva Convention for Upper Silesia] prescribed a regime of
convalescence after the dangerous political operation of partition.
The dangers recognized as looming ahead were partly economic and
partly human. But the regime intended as a cure was throughout a
legal one; it consisted of legal stipulations, extending to the most
varied domains of life, imposed as legally binding in the two coun-
tries, and in part administered or sanctioned by international
organs. It was, in fact, a great experiment.... The elimination of
chaos and violence through legal order and legal process was its
purpose.88
This passage encapsulates the fundamentals of the high Modernist per-
spective: the "chaos and violence" of the nationalist conflict in the region
between 1919 and 1921 led to a radical international legal innovation, the
piercing of sovereignty through the "dangerous political operation" of
partitioning the region. This drastic departure from the traditional form
then required the creation of a complex and sophisticated "legal" con-
struction, the "great experiment" of the transitional regime: "an experi-
85. See, e.g., Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia (Minority Schools) Case, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A) No. 12.
86. See The Report of the Committee of Experts (1921), reprinted in GEORGES KAECKENBEECK,
THE INTERNATIONAL EXPERIMENT OF UPPER SILESIA 554 (1942).
87. KAECKENBEECK, supra note 86, at 25. Kaeckenbeeck was president of the "Arbitral
Tribunal," one of the international organs that supervised the Upper Silesia regime.
88. Id. at 23.
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ment-in the full force of the word-in treaty-making, in international
organization, and in treaty-sanctioning." 89 Nationalist disruption autho-
rizes the departure from the state, the traditional defining object of inter-
national law, and gives rise to autonomous legal creativity.
Kaeckenbeeck began his study by declaring that the Upper Silesia
experiment entailed the transcendence of the traditional debates in inter-
national legal theory. Kaeckenbeeck criticized both positivism and natu-
ralism, i.e., those who would "invest any practice of States... with the
glamour of law," on the one hand, and those who try to "deduce it solely
from a few accepted principles," on the other.' Both methods seek to
assure "coherence and plausibility"9 for international law. Kaeck-
enbeeck urged international law to take the risk of experimentation, the
risk of departing from traditional canons of "coherence."
Such a risk, he contended, was taken by the creators and implementors
of the Upper Silesia regime. As an experiment, the Geneva Convention
was particularly "rich in devices" for the interpretation and application
of its provisions.92 He praised the "detail" of the Convention and its
"novelty"; "above all," he celebrated the abundance of experience it pro-
vided in "testing a large variety of co-operative devices and international
procedures."93
Kaeckenbeeck portrayed the drafting conference of the Geneva Con-
vention that set up the Silesia regime as a foreshadowing of the regime
itself. The conference parcelled out the various tasks to teams of "techni-
cal experts." Its work was thus marked by a "far-reaching division of
labor, but with a reasonably flexible procedure in which the ultimate con-
trol rested with the [internationally appointed] President."94
This relationship between the technical experts and the Drafting
Committee led by the international President bears a striking resem-
blance to the relationship described by Le Corbusier between the archi-
tect and her subordinates. The technical experts worked out the
fundamental elements required for the solution of particular problems.
Such technical expertise, however, could not result in a legal masterpiece
any more than the elements of construction discovered by engineers and
others could produce an architectural triumph. The "technical experts"
were not "experienced draftsmen"; their work, not always based on the
same "legal assumptions," had to be harmonized into a unified
document. 95
89. Id. at 24-25.
90. Id. at 1.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 2.
93. Id. at 25. Kaeckenbeeck takes particular pride in the fact that this "Convention had 606
articles (the Treaty of Versailles had only 440!)." Id.
94. Id. at 13.
95. Id. at 13.
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It was ultimately left to the international President to effect that har-
monization, that "single authoritative French document" which would
"affect the whole life of that deserving people."96 The Geneva Conven-
tion for Upper Silesia was not merely supposed to revitalize the economic
life of the region but to insure its political and cultural harmony. For Le
Corbusier, the task of organizing the fundamental forms tested whether
one was an "artist" or a mere "engineer";97 similarly, the creation of the
Upper Silesia regime showed whether the President was a "lawyer," in
the newly heightened sense, or a mere "technical expert." The modern
"primitives"-whether engineers or "technical experts"-provided the
fundamental forms, the raw material for the Modernist master to work
with. The master, however, was required for the creation of a cultural
masterpiece-be it a Modernist building or a comprehensive legal con-
struction like the regime for Upper Silesia, Danzig or the Saar. With her
newfound autonomy and innovativeness, the Modernist lawyer would be
able to dispense with the traditional devices for assuring international
legal "coherence and plausibility."9 "
Indeed, despite its radical "experimentalism," Kaeckenbeeck repeat-
edly insisted that the regime remained a specifically legal creation. This
specifically legal quality could be found in its emphasis on innovations in
legal doctrine and on the kinds of institutions set up to administer those
innovations. In particular, Kaeckenbeeck emphasized the local legal
institutions established by the Geneva Convention, the "Arbitral Tribu-
nal" and the "Mixed Commission." These local institutions would play
the role of autonomous legal instances coordinating the competing
dimensions of international life: the central legal instance of the World
Court, the political maneuverings of sovereign states in the League, and
the nationalist passions of the populace.
Thus, on the one hand, the creation of local international legal institu-
tions marked, for Kaeckenbeeck, a great advance in international institu-
tional structure; the international community's central organs were too
political, its Court too distant, to engage in the requisite inquiries.
Kaeckenbeeck laid great stress on the legal procedure of the Mixed Com-
mission, a procedure that included both fact finding and legal ruling. He
compared
two very different methods of protection [of minorities]: the diplo-
matic protection of the League Council, and the local one, before
President [of the Mixed Commission] Calonder. . . . President
Calonder looked at the whole matter from the point of view of legal-
ity and of equity to individuals, whereas the solutions of the Council
96. Id. at 20 (quoting President Calonder of the Drafting Conference, and, later, of the Mixed
Commission).
97. LE CORBUSIER, TOWARDS A NEW ARCHITECTURE, supra note 74, at 201.
98. KAECKENBEECK, supra note 86, at 1.
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. . . were determined mostly by the parallelogram of political
forces.99
Ideally, then, the local legal instance would be able to press the central-
ized international organs, as well as the pertinent sovereigns, into its own
service. 00
On the other hand, the turbulent nature of local minority disputes
necessitated an autonomous field for law:
[T]hese nationalist passions were like elemental forces.... [W]hat
President Calonder needed for his activity was the solid basis of
legal principle."0 '
The legal instance that was at once local and international was thus
the epitome of international legal Modernism. The innovative creation
of an autonomous legal instance was made possible by "nationalist pas-
sion" and directed toward the creation of a complex, unprecedentedly
"detailed," work of international law. Such an instance remained in
touch both with its "primitivist" and its experimentalist dimensions by
operating on the autonomous, "solid basis of legal principle." In com-
parison with a local procedure of an autonomous international legal
instance, even the World Court could appear as too rooted in traditional
notions of the dignity of sovereignty. The local, international institutions
boldly asserted creative license to explore the range of specifically legal
possibilities, freed from the constraints of an extra-legal positivist or
nationalist grounding. International legal Modernism reached its culmi-
nation with this desire for the doctrinal and institutional freedom to
coordinate the heterogeneous dimensions of international life.
The comprehensive compositions of interwar legal Modernism con-
tinue to enthrall the international legal imagination. In the post-World
War II period, versions of the Upper Silesia regime have been proposed
for intractable nationalist conflicts from Palestine to Cambodia.'0 2 We
international lawyers continue to believe in the ability of such compre-
hensive Plans to deliver on the dual Modernist promise of liberation and
order. We must not forget, however, that the ever-present temptation of
this sort of Modernist creativity is that of authoritarianism, a temptation
to which the first administrators of the League of Nations regime for the
Saar succumbed on more than one occasion.'o 3 I would hasten to add, of
course, that authority exercised by international bodies has never taken
99. Id. at 534.
100. Unfortunately, Kaeckenbeeck notes, a major problem with the enforcement of minority
rights during the temporary regime was precisely the refusal of the Council to accept this role.
101. Id. at 361.
102. The first of these postwar Plans, for Palestine, was an imitative tribute to the Upper Silesia
regime. It succeeded in preventing war for an even shorter period than its precursor. See Plan for
Partition with Economic Union, G.A. Res. 181, U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess. (1947).
103. See, e.g., MICHAEL FLORINSKY, THE SAAR STRUGGLE 39-44 (1934).
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the form of an elite-directed nationalist mobilization; international
authorities have generally kept their irony and humanism when they
have found temptingly heightened power at their disposal." 4
In its legal form, the authoritarian temptation arises from the augmen-
tation of the role of the lawyer that follows the specifically Modernist
critique of representation. This temptation is far from diminished by the
presence of populist elements, such as the plebiscite, in the tool kit of
legal techniques; on the contrary, it arises precisely from the paradoxical
Modernist composite of deference to the vital, "primitive" energy of the
"people," and insistence on the heightened creativity, authority, and nov-
elty of the high-cultural instance. It is this composite that enabled cer-
tain cultural Modernists to articulate our most cherished hopes for
liberation and others to ignore the horrific quality of some of our cen-
tury's distinctive ideologies.
In this essay, I have presented the Modernist articulation of three
familiar lawyerly roles: specialized adviser, sophisticated judge, compre-
hensive constitutional designer. In discussing these roles today, we often
neglect the cultural assumptions they embody. I have sought to reflect
on these assumptions through a particular kind of history-by-juxtaposi-
tion. Unlike traditional practitioners of American "law and humanities"
studies, however, I am not trying to "enrich" the law with cultural
sophistication; rather, I am trying to show how the juxtaposition of law
and other cultural domains can shed light on both, and, in particular,
highlight the promises and dangers implicit in all forms of Modernism.
If, as I would argue, we all remain Modernists (despite our desires for a
"post"), we must also seek some critical awareness of its temptations and
blindspots. In the 1990's, we are faced with yet another collapse of the
imperial structure of central Europe, the resurgence of nationalist pas-
sion, and a newly heightened confidence among international statesmen
in the nobility and efficacy of complex international plans. I would con-
clude with the following cautionary note: in our current cultural and
political situation, we can only avoid being deafened by the universal
clamor for reconstruction by a vigilant historical critique of its rhetoric.
By recently resurrecting that historically suspect phrase, the New World
Order, the American president has unwittingly reminded us of where the
enthusiasm for intellectual and political renewal can lead.
104. This essay, originally written in the fall of 1990, refrains from any analysis of the
implications of the Gulf War.
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